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BOOK REVIEWS
Judah P. Benjamin. By Robert Douthat Meade. New York: Oxford
University Press. 1943. Pp. ix, 432. $3.75.
The field of the biographer has been overworked, and professional
biographers are hard put to it to find fresh subjects. The consequence
is that we are getting some biographies that had best been left unwritten. A recent biography of Sir Wm. BlackstQne proved uninteresting because, although the subject was a famous and learned man and
the biographer a good writer, Sir William was neither a man of action
nor had he taken a part in any great or stirring events. After stating
that Sir William was the first Vinerian professor of law at Oxford,
that he wrote the Commentaries and later became a judge, nothing
more of interest remained to be said. In order to make "a book," the
author of necessity had to resort to eulogies, encomiums and adjectives.
No such difficulty confronts Robert Douthat Meade, Professor of
History at Randolph-Macon College, in writing the biography of Judah
P. Benjamin. This is so because Benjamin lived in a turbulent period
and, as lawyer, businessman and statesman, he played such a part
successively in the affairs of two nations that the biographer's problem
is one of selection and rejection from a veritable gold mine of historical
facts, rather than difficulty in finding something to say.
Benjamin, a Jew, was born of impecunious parents, in the year
1811, in the British West Indies. Before the year 1852, he had become the unquestioned leader of the bar of the fast-growing metropolis
of New Orleans, the promoter and builder of what subsequently became the Illinois Central Railroad, a sugar planter and refiner, owning
a hundred slaves.
Benjamin's father, always a financial failure, was a rover "ever
seeking to find greener pastures elsewhere." The family lived for a
time in Wilmington, North Carolina, where little Judah helped his
father keep the store, and at Fayetteville he was fortunate in getting
a thorough grounding from an excellent Scotch teacher. Through the
generosity of a family friend, Judah was enabled to go to Yale University, entering in 1825 at the early age of 14, and, for the two years
of his attendance, he led his class.
In his junior year, Benjamin was expelledfrom Yale under circumstances which, 33 years later, enabled his political enemies to
charge that he had been expelled for stealing. Prof. Meade has gone to
the original sources and, for the first time, has produced all the extant
facts on the subject, including the original minutes of the Yale debating
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societies and the contemporary correspondence with the President of
the University. But unfortunately, the record still leaves the cause of
his dismissal a matter of legitimate dispute. However, confidence in
Benjamin's innocence and general probity is evidenced by the curious
fact that, after Louisiana had seceded from the Union and Benjamin
had become Attorney General in the Confederate Cabinet, his loyal
friend James A. Bayard, Senator of the United States from the State
of Delaware, wrote him a warm letter of friendship and confidence,
oflfering all possible assistance in connection with the resurrected Yale
incident.
Upon receiving his license to practice law, Benjamin contracted an
unfortunate marriage with Mademoiselle Natalie St. Martin, a Creole,
who found life on their plantation "triste" and decamped with their
5-year-old daughter for Paris. Benjamin supported them in luxury
and each summer crossed the Atlantic to pay them an annual visit.
When Benjamin in a letter cautioned his wife to be less extravagant,
she replied, "Don't talk to me about economy; it is so fatiguing."
Benjamin, the busy and successful lawyer, lived in New Orleans
and spent only week-ends at his plantation, "Bellechasse," eighteen miles
across and down the Mississippi. After the departure of his wife, he
brought from Charleston and installed at Bellechasse his mother and
his gifted sisters, Rebecca (whom he called "Sis"), Hattie, and Penina
("Penny"), who later became the mother of the well-known financier,
Julius Krutschnitt. Life at Bellechasse is charmingly portrayed. So
far had this impecunious Jewish boy, with his mother and sisters, risen
in ante-bellum southern society, that when renowned people of the
nation came to New Orleans they brought letters of introduction to
Benjamin. On a Thursday he would write Sis that he was bringing
down for the week-end a few guests, and "please have things nice, you
know the way I like 'em."
Benjamin's mother, like Spinoza, Disraeli, Cardozo and Brandeis,
was a Sephardic Jew, so heredity must be the explanation not only of
the intellectual force but also of the innate gentility of her children.
In the days of their poverty, she "always held her head high," and, on
one occasion, returned to her sisters a generous ciest of linen, with
gracious thanks, saying "her wants were amply provided for."
In 1852 Benjamin was elected to the United States Senate, as the
nominee of the Whig Party. During the eight years that he was a
senator he argued more cases before the United States Supreme Court,
next to Reverdy Johnson, than any other lawyer. His success as an
advocate was largely due to his power of statement. In a case where
he was opposed by Jeremiah Black, during a recess taken after Benjamin's opening, one of the justices is reported to have said to Black,
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"You had better look to your laurels, for that little Jew from New
Orleans has stated your case out of court."
In 1853 Benjamin was nominated by President Fillmore to be a
justice of the Supreme Court but, unwilling to forego his handsome
income as a lawyer, he declined the great honor.
On the Senate floor we see him crossing swords with the overbearing Charles Sumner and besting him, and engaging in sharp debate with Win, H. Seward. In 1856 he renounced his allegiance to
the Whig Party, and in 1858 was re-elected on the Democratic ticket.
Without resort to epithets, he denounced Stephen A. Douglas, and so
forcefully stated the facts convicting him of advocating one policy before the slaveholding Southern States and an inconsistent policy against
Lincoln in Illinois, that he thereby forever alienated the Southern vote
from Douglas.
For a time he was esteemed as being no more than adroit, clever,
"nimble-witted," and the "ditto" for the other Louisiana Senator, John
Slidell; but he soon demonstrated in the Senate, as well as elsewhere,
that he was not lacking in personal and physical courage. In an acrimonious debate, the intolerant Jefferson Davis stated he had "no idea
that he was to be met with the argument of a paid attorney in the
Senate Chamber." Benjamin rose and asked if he had rightly heard
the words "paid attorney," and Davis replied with asperity, "Yes, those
were the very words." Thereupon Benjamin wrote a note of direct
challenge to a duel, and the next day Davis offered adequate apologies
on the floor of the Senate. The incident created in Davis an enduring
respect, and no doubt influenced him to choose Benjamin as his righthand man in the Confederate Cabinet.
After Louisiana had seceded, Benjamin made a farewell address
in the Senate which so moved friend and foe alike that the gallery
broke into spontaneous applause.
In Jefferson Davis' Cabinet, Benjamin served faithfully from the
day of its formation until its collapse in 1865. As if sitting by Benjanin's side, we are shown wartime life first at Montgomery and then
at Richmond. As Attorney General, he not only organized the Confederate Courts and the other affairs of his own department, but, being
the only practical businessman in the Cabinet, he organized and systematized the whole work of the Government.
As acting Secretary of War, we see him struggling with the problems of getting guns, powder, clothing and medicine for the troops,
and continually at odds with the military men.
Mrs. Jefferson Davis became a great admirer, and from her and
other contemporaries we get rare pictures of the short, burly man, with
side whiskers, a musical voice, and tireless energy. After laboring into
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the. night, Mr. Davis would emerge exhausted, but Benjamin would
first dine well and then go off to play at cards, billiards or bowling.
His habitual cheerfulness prompted a Confederate General to say that
Benjamin "cared no more for the Confederacy than for a last-year's
bird nest," and General Wise customarily referred to him as the "oleaginous Benjamin."
Indeed, the rare temperament of the man was the key to his success. Troubles never weighed upon him; he indulged in no repining
or lamenting, but wasintent only upon devising and executing the next
step to be taken. During the darkest days of the Confederacy, Mrs.
Hoge, wife of the Presbyterian minister, looked out of her window
and said, "There goes Mr. Benjamin, smiling as usual."
After the loss of Roanoke Island, the demand for his removal as
Secretary of War was insistent. But Jefferson Davis could not spare
such a practical man from the Cabinet, and made him Secretary of
State. There we get a new slant on the South's problems of diplomacy and her maneuvering for recognition by England and France.
Should the South withhold her cotton from English and French mills
and thereby force recognition; or should she ship cotton to obtain
credits for the purchase of military supplies?
Upon receiving news of the surrender at Appomattox, the Cabinet
fled as a body, most of them on horseback; but Benjamin, too fat to
ride, travelled in a buggy. From Danville to Greensboro, to Charlotte
we follow them, and all the way to Washington, Georgia, where they
separated. This flight of the Cabinet, with the Union Army looking
for them, is so filled with human interest that it would make an entertaining book of itself. Benjamin, with inexhaustible wit and humor,
kept up the spirits of the party.
After separating from the balance of the Cabinet, Benjamin, in
disguise, eventually made his way to the west coast of Florida, where
he hired an open boat and escaped to Havana. Thus the career of
Benjamin in America was forever terminated.
Upon arriving in England in the autumn of 1865, he determined
to become a British Barrister, notwithstanding that he was confronted
with rules which required that he should "eat dinners" for three years
before being admitted. But, through the generosity of the British
Bar, the rules were relaxed and, after a few months, Benjamin, a stranger in a foreign land, a fugitive of the collapsed Confederacy, and
known to be despised by the Federal Government, became a briefless
Barrister at age 55.
While waiting for business, he wrote Benjamin on Sales, which immediately became a sensation, and it remains today the leading work
on that subject.
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During these lean days, he was writing affectionately to his sisters
in America, offering financial assistance, "say $100 a month," when he,
himself, was eating bread and cheese, and walking to his chambers
because he could not afford a cab and did not wish to be seen riding
a penr.y bus.
In following the account of Benjamin's meteoric rise at the British
Bar, we learn about practice generally in England, including the unique
precedent which draws a dead line between law business which must
be taken to the solicitor (roughly speaking, the business or office lawyer) and that which the solicitor (not the client) takes to the Barrister (roughly speaking, the advocate and occasional adviser). In
1870 Cyrus W. McCormick came to London to establish his harvester
business in Europe, and wished to be advised by Mr. Benjamin. But
in obedience to precedent, Benjamin had to send him out to employ
solicitors first, and then come back, through them, in the regular way.
In the next seventeen years we see Mr. Benjamin become the
absolute leader of the British Bar-his income of around $75,000
per year exceeding that of any British Barrister. His versatility and
his ability to speak both French and Spanish enabled him to handle cases
coming from jurisdictions not having the common law-ground upon
which the ordinary Barrister feared to tread. A solicitor once handed
him a document in Spanish, requesting an opinion and promising a
translation next day.
"It is unnecessary," said Benjamin. "1 read Spanish."
The solicitor replied, "Oh, Mr. Benjamin, what don't you know !"
So great became his reputation for ability to win cases, that solicitors and the litigants themselves felt they must have Mr. Benjamin.
He finally fixed a minimum retainer of 100 pounds for appearance in
any court, and it will astonish American lawyers to learn that, with
the assistance of "juniors," he was customarily trying several cases on
trial at the same time, and in different courts.
Upon the announcement of his retirement in 1883, the Attorney
General and the entire Bar tendered him a farewell banquet, an occurrence so unusual as to be accounted for only by reason of the high
regard in which he was held, and the Englishman's sense of sportsmanship. At the banquet, we hear the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief
Justice generously expressing the affection of the Bar and its regret
at his leaving.
While many men could have built either one of his careers, there
is no parallel of a lawyer's having built a second great career in a foreign land, upon the ruins of the first.
Unquestionably, Mr. Benjamin excelled in commercial cases, but
his practice was as general as the time afforded, and we find in this
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book interesting accounts of trials of national importance, where we
see Benjamin in action and get speciments of his technique and advocacy.
Prof' Meade has well performed the task of the true historian. He
has searched the records of the U. S. Senate and of the Supreme Court
at Washington, the archives of the Confederacy at Richmond, and the
records of the English Law Courts at London. He has set forth the
facts as he found them, letting the chips fall where they may, and
leaving to the reader his inalienable right to form his own conclusions.
To the reader-for-pleasure-only the book will be as entertaining as a
novel of adventure. The lawyer and the student of human nature
will read it with profit as well as pleasure, and will talk about it for
a long time.
JAmEs H. WINSTON.
Member of the Chicago Bar
Chicago, Ill.
Patent Property and the Anti-Monopoly Laws. By Otto Raymond
Barnett. Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merrill Co. 1943. Pp. vii, 432.

$10.00.
Mr. Barnett on account of his wide experience, is amply qualified to
author the above-entitled treatise. He points out the founding of patents, copyrights, in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution
giving Congress the right to promote the progress of science and useful
arts by securing for a limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries. Prior to this enactment by Congress, common law gave the inventor the right to make
and use the invention, but did not give him the right to exclude others
from employing the invention. Patent statutes do not give the inventor what comrmon law has already given him, but give to him the exclusive right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
patented products.
By giving an individual a patent, the individual does not receive
anything belonging to the public, but it is something new and heretofore unknown, but the public benefits by having use of the invention
at the end of the patent period. It is to be noted that Congress has
only constitutional authority to granf an exclusive right to the invention, and if Congress should enact a law giving the inventor less than
the full and exclusive right of excluding others from practicing the invention, such a law would be unconstitutional.
A patentee may grant license under his patents, and may limit the
number of articles made, the selling price of the articles, and the method
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of sale, but this selling price cannot be carried on to the second and
subsequent purchasers, as this would be contrary to the anti-trust laws.
Under a patent, a licensor cannot bind the licensee to deal only in
his patented article, and not to deal in any other articles in competition
with the patented article, as this is outside of the domain of the patent.
A patent is really a triple monopoly in that it gives the right to exclude all others from manufacturing the invention, the right to exclude
all others from using the invention, and the right to exclude all others
from selling any articles embodying the patented invention.
Since the establishment of the Supreme Court until quite recently,
it has been the established law that a licensee will not be heard to urge
the invalidity of the patent under which he is licensed, as a defense in
a suit to recover royalties, but recently the Supreme Court has held
that if the licensee alleges invalidity of the patent, and also alleges that
the license is contrary to the anti-trust laws in view of the fact that it
imposes limitations which are contrary to law, if the patent is invalid,
can now plead invalidity of the patent even though he is licensed under
the patent.
If a number of manufacturers owning different patents enter into
a contract whereby competition between them is lessened, such an
agreement is outside the scope of the patents, and is unlawful. Neither
can a patentee compel a licensee to use unpatented supplies as a condition of the license, as this is called a tying-in contract, and is condemned by the courts.
In the absence of a contract, joint owners of a patent may each practice the invention independently of the others, and license others to do
so without accounting to the other joint owners for any part of the
profits, and joint owners may not lawfully agree to conditions limiting
competition between themselves in the practice of the patented invention.

Where several groups are carrying on a legal business of making
patented machines which do not compete with each other, a combination
of the several groups does not violate the anti-trust act unless it restrains competition and builds up a monopoly extending beyond the
domain of the patent.
On the other hand, where numerous patents are owned by competitors in the same field where there have been many conflicts as to
infringement, and as to actual inventorship, or where there is every

reason to anticipate such conflicts, and where the situation is clarified
by conveyance of all patents to a common holder or trustee who thereupon licenses all parties to the pool under all of the patents with some
or all of the restraints of the trade which are legitimate in such licenses,

such an arrangement has been sustained as being a legitimate use of
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If such

an agreement merely allows the parties to it to embody in their output
various patented inventions which they could not otherwise use and
does not restrain any potential competition, such an agreement is valid,
but if it does restrain competition, it is invalid, and if in such an agree-

ment, each owner is licensed by the pool to use only the patents which
he contributed to the pool, then such an agreement is invalid in view
of the anti-trust laws.
It is incumbent upon a patent owner to exercise due diligence in

asserting his rights against infringers, and if he, after notification of
an infringer, as to his infringement of a patent, does not use diligence
in actually bringing suit, then recent cases have held that he not only
cannot secure profits or damages, but cannot even get an injunction
from the infringer, because the patentee has sat idly by and not only
watched the infringer make large profits, but has also watched him build
up a lucrative business in a field which the patentee is now endeavoring
to take over.
The government is intervening more and more by prosecuting companies and individuals under the anti-trust laws for violation of patent
rights. There has been a great increase in the number of suits brought,
and these suits have been very expensive to the defendants. An extreme instance is the case of United States v. Aluminum Co., 44 F.
Supp. 97 (1941), which was on trial in court for over two years, and
cost the defendants a million dollars or more to defend, yet the court
in its two-hundred page opinion carefully considered all of the issues
and decided every point in favor of the defendant. In another suit of
the United States v. Aerofin Corporation et al., C. A. 20-458 (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1943) the government asked that the defendant must be
compelled to license any applicant under any of his patents free Of
royalties and free of all restrictions and free of all limitations with
respect to prices and all other practices, and that the defendant be restrained from issuing any license, distributor's agreement, manufacturer's license agreement, or any other agreement in which is contained
any obligation under, or by virtue of said letters patent, and on the
same day, the bill was filed, the defendants agreed to a consent decree
cancelling all licenses, and the defendants agreed to the order ordering
them to grant unrestricted and royalty free licenses under the patent
in suit. In other words, the defendants realized that the defense of the
suit would probably result in bankruptcy on account of the great expense, and gave in rather than face the enormous expense of defendibg
the suit.
The Supreme Court has recently rendered some revolutionary -lecisions in which it has assumed the role of judicial legislation instead
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of merely interpreting the laws. In the Morton Salt Case, 314 U. S.
488, in 1942, the Supreme Court for the first time, held squarely that
the owner of a patent cannot maintain action against a clear case of
infringement if it appears that in his relations with anyone, he has
endeavored to use his patent to influence the sale of an unpatented
supply. The Court denied the fact that a patent right is a legal right,
and is not an equitable right. The Supreme Court has made this decision and other decisions regardless of the fact that Congress has
refused to pass laws to that effect. For example, Congress previously
had refused to pass a law stating that it would be a complete defense
in any suit for infringement of a patent to prove that the complainant
in such suit is using or controlling the patents in violation of any laws
of the United States relating to unlawful restraint and monopolies, or
relating to combinations, contracts, agreements, or understandings in
restraint of trade or in violation of the Clayton Act or the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
The Supreme Court has lost sight of the fact that a patent is property, that infringement is a trespass, and that denial of the right to
recover for such a trespass is obviously a deprivation of plaintiff's
property. The decision of the court in the Morton Salt Case is clearly
a case of judicial legislation.
The Supreme Court also in 317 U. S.173 (1942). decided the case
of Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., overturning the long established and seemingly settled law that a licensee may never question the
validity of a patent under which he is licensed, the logical implications
of that decision going much further. This case decided that where a
licensee is sued for unpaid royalties-and it is noted that unless there
is diversity of citizenship, such a suit must be brought in a state court,
for it is not a suit under the patent laws-if the license imposes any
conditions which would be in unlawful restraint or trade or any contract not within the patented domain, then the licensee may plead? that
the patent is invalid, and therefore, the restraint is an unlawful restraint of trade, hence under the Sherman Act, the contract is void,
and there can be no recovery under it.
Followed to its logical conclusion, the doctrine announced in the
Sola Case leads to the proposition that, in any case, a licensee may
question the validity of the licensed patent. This doctrine lays open
the door so that whenever the government sees fit to attack any patent
agreement as in violation of the anti-trust laws, it may attack the
validity of every patent which is relied on to sustain the agreement
as being within the patented domain, and will resolve itself into an
inquiry as to the prior patents consisting of thousands of patents. The
prospects of such litigation are staggering, courts will be occupied for
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years on single cases, the expense of such litigation will be ruinous to
the defendant, as the plaintiff has all the resources of the United States
government behind it.
In the case of United States v. Hartford Empire Co. 46 F. Supp.
541 (1942), referred to as the Glass Machine Case, the defendant was
prosecuted for licensing one company to make one kind of container,
and another company to make another kind of container, and each one
limited to the amount of containers it could make. There was a pooling
of patents by the various companies, but the main patent involved an
entirely new and original suction device patent, enabling containers
to be made very much more cheaply than they could be made under
patents already expired. The various glass companies at the cost of
millions of dollars had evolved and patented this new machinery which
enabled the public to obtain glass containers at a very much lower
price than it had heretofore obtained such containers. Nevertheless
the court decided that any future -distribution of the automatic machinery by defendants must be on a basis of outright sale at reasonable
prices, that all existing agreements and licenses must be cancelled, and
new agreements must be free of restriction, and approved by the court,
and that hereafter any manufacturer of glassware may produce any
item he desires, and that the defendants will be enjoined from using
interstate commerce unless they comply with the orders of the court,
and agree to license anyone royalty free on all present patents and
pending application for patents for the life of the patents, and make
available to anyone who desires them copies of the drawings and patterns relating to such devices, feeders, forming machines, and the like.
In other words, this court confiscated patents or property belonging
to the defendant.
The author points out that if this decision should be confirmed by
the Supreme Court, it will entirely wreck our patent system, and make
all patents of no value whatsoever. How can large companies invest
millions of dollars in laboratories to produce containers, electric light
bulbs, and many other things which otherwise would never have been
produced and at greatly decreased cost, if such patents which they
might obtain from such expensive laboratory experiments, are to be
dedicated to the public? These cases are a clear indication of judicial
legislation, and doing what Congress should do, and usurping the
powers granted to Congress and not the interpreting of laws passed
by the legislative branch of the government.
It is well-settled law that a patent is property and entitled to all
the constitutional protection of any other property right, and that the
patentee has the absolute right to exclude any utilization of the patented
invention without the patentee's consent during the life of the patent,
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and that the patent is subject to all laws which are pertinent to any
other pfoperty, and that the patentee may license anyone he desires.
The government in many anti-trust cases heretofore brought contends that a patent is not property, but is a mere franchise granted by
grace of the government and contrary to the common right, and that
the patent owner is under obligations to permit anyone to practice his
patented invention, and that if the patentee grants a license to anyone,
the patent owner must grant a license on reasonable terms to all manufacturers desiring to participate, and that a license or agreement by a
patent owner permitting a licensee to practice the patented invention
only within specific limitations is an unlawful restraint of trade.
The above line of cases by the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates
that the Supreme Court is judicially legislating laws which were refused to be passed by Congress. These cases show that judicial legislation has run wild. The outstanding evil is that wherr such judicial
legislation is found in the opinions of the United States Supreme Court,
which is the final tribunal interpreting all laws, there ceases to be any
constitutional protection short of congressional legislation which shall
determine a different policy.
In view of the principle of judicial legislation by the Supreme Court,
it would seem to be unnecessary for Congress to pass a law stating that
violation of the anti-trust law shall not be a defense to a suit for infringement, that in a suit by a licensor against a licensee for violation
of an otherwise valid agreement, the licensee may not plead invalidity
of the licensed patent, that in prosecutions for violations of the antitrust laws by virtue of license agreement under patents, the government shall not. be entitled to charge that the contracts involved are
unlawful, because the patents which have been granted by that same
government are invalid, but with the line of decisions as above-discussed, it would seem that we have entered a new era where such negative legislation is essential if patent owners are to be protected against
the progressive trend of judicial legislation which is not based on any
statutory authority, and is, in fact, contrary to the proposed laws which
Congress has considered and repeatedly refused to enact.
In many typical cases brought by the United States Government
within recent years, for charges of violation of the anti-monopoly laws,
there has been set forth the proposition that the following practices are
every one in violation of the anti-monopoly laws:
1. The granting of a license in a limited field.
2. The granting of a license to one competitor involves an obligation to license all competitors who request a license.
3. The acquiring of improvement patents by the owner of a basic
patent.
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4. The settlement of litigation by acquiring the patent in litigation.
5. The requirement that improvements upon the licensed patent
devised by a licensee shall be assigned to the licensor.
6. The requirement that the licensee shall not contest the validity
of the licensed patent.
7. Licensing the use of a patented machine only with certain cooperating licensed mechanisms.
8. Limiting the number of patented machines which the licensee
may use.
9. Limiting the use of a patented machine to the manufacture of
certain specified types of ware.
10. Limiting the use of a patented machine to a certain maximum
output.
11. Requiring as a condition of the continuance of the license that
the licensee shall produce a certain minimum output.
The government proposes that all patents shall be licensed at a reasonable royalty to anyone regardless of the cost to the patent owner of
developing the new invention. If this is true, then, anyone having a
horse should be compelled to hire or sell it to anyone else who desired
it at a reasonable price, or anyone having a piece of land or other property should be compelled to rent or sell it to whoever desires it at what
a government agent would say is a reasonable price.
In other words, it means the taking of private property and licensing
competitors in using the same in competition with the lawful owner of
the property. If extended to other fields, it means the taking of all
property for the common use. Unless the public awakens to the danger of destroying our patent system, the leading place of this country
in the world of industry will be destroyed, and it will lead to the communal ownership of all property and the disappearing of private property.
This book is loaded with dynamite, and frankly discusses the situation facing all of us today. It is a book which should be read by
every member of Congress and by every member of the Bar of this
country. It will not only give the general practitioner a clear idea of
licenses and agreements into which his clients may enter, but it will
give him a new prospectus on the danger which faces us from within.
PAUL

Charlotte, North Carolina
Member of Charlotte Bar

B. EATON.

